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PERSISTENT NONVIOLENT CONFLICT 
WITH NO RECONCILIATION: 
THE FLEMISH AND WALLOONS IN 
BELGIUM 
ROBERT MNOOKIN* 
ALAIN VERBEKE** 
I 
BYE–BYE BELGIUM? 
On December 13, 2006, Belgium’s French-speaking public television 
network RTBF interrupted its regular programming with breaking news that 
Flanders had declared its independence, the Belgian state was breaking apart, 
and the King had left the country for the Congo. Inspired by Orson Welles’ The 
War of the Worlds, a ninety-minute news special followed that touched upon a 
possibility somewhat less fanciful than an invasion from Mars. CNBC reported 
it as news.
1 Some foreign embassies sent worried messages back home. 
Thousands of ordinary Belgians made panicked phone calls. The next morning 
many Belgian politicians condemned the show as a “bad joke” that might open 
a Pandora’s Box by making discussable a topic that had long been somewhat 
taboo—the possible dissolution of the Belgian state because of the persistent 
conflict between the French-speaking Walloons and the Dutch-speaking 
Flemish.
2 
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  2. For political reactions reported the day after the program, see Reacties. Vlaanderen, DE 
STANDAARD, Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://www.standaard.be/Artikel/Detail.aspx?artikelId=DMF1 
3122006_098&word=RTBF. The TV program was followed by a book, released the following day. 
PHILIPPE DUTILLEUL, BYE–BYE BELGIUM (OPÉRATION BBB): L’ÉVENÉMENT TÉLÉVISUEL (2006). 
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The most striking feature of contemporary Belgium is a language cleavage 
that is territorial. Out of a population of about ten million, about forty percent 
speak French as their mother tongue and about sixty percent speak Dutch.
3 In 
the south—the Walloon region—nearly everyone speaks French;
4 in the north—
Flanders—the language is Dutch.
5 This linguistic divide has existed since the 
Roman Empire and has changed little since the eleventh century.
6 In the center, 
the capital, Brussels, is officially bilingual, but the vast majority of its 
inhabitants are Francophones. 
Any notion that the conflict between the Flemish and the Walloons was a 
thing of the past, of little contemporary relevance, was blown away by the 
controversy concerning the “Manifesto for an Independent Flanders Within 
Europe,” a 252-page report issued at the end of 2005.
7 The argument of the 
Manifesto can be easily summarized: 
1.  Flanders and Wallonia have divergent needs and goals because they 
have profound differences—political, economic, social, and cultural.
8 
2.  The two regions are artificially held together only by a “maladjusted 
and inefficient” federal governmental structure with antimajoritarian 
restrictions and “chaotic distribution of powers.”
9 
3.  As a result of this structure, rational and efficient policymaking is 
impossible, and Flanders is unable to adopt those policies necessary 
to maintain economic competitiveness and so insure future economic 
growth in the face of the socio-economic challenges of an aging 
population, ever-growing globalization, and increased international 
competition. 
4.  A further result of this structure is that at the national level, bad 
compromises are negotiated that require the Flemish people to 
make “[e]xorbitant and inefficient” financial transfers
10 amounting to 
over ten billion euros per year (about 1,734 euros for each Flemish 
 
  3.  In one small area of Belgium, the East Canton region obtained from Germany after World War 
I, German is the principal language of about 70,000 Belgians. 
  4.  Belgian French is standard French, not a separate language, although there are some variations 
in vocabulary. 
  5.  The official language spoken in Flanders is now standard Dutch, not a separate Flemish dialect, 
although several local dialects still exist. See KENNETH D. MCRAE, 2 CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN 
MULTILINGUAL SOCIETIES 56–59 (1986). 
  6. Id.  at 17. 
 7.  REFLECTION  GROUP  “IN DE WARANDE,” MANIFESTO FOR AN INDEPENDENT  FLANDERS 
WITHIN EUROPE (2005). 
  8. Id. at 35–100. See also generally Stefaan De Rynck & Karolien Dezeure, Policy Convergence 
and Divergence in Belgium: Education and Health Care, 29 W. EUR. POL. 1018 (2006). 
 9.  REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 101–06. 
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person) to Wallonia and Brussels.
11 If Flanders remains part of 
Belgium, these subsidies are likely only to increase.
12 
5.  The only durable solution is the full independence of Flanders. 
Flanders is ready for independence because, by reason of its 
economic and social development since World War II, it has the 
identity and self-sufficiency necessary to be a full-fledged national 
community, with all the characteristics of an independent member 
state of Europe.
13 
The manifesto is neither shrill nor highly rhetorical. Instead, it has the 
dispassionate, analytic tone and impressive graphics of a report that might have 
been prepared by McKinsey and Company. Nor was it created and endorsed by 
persons thought to be extreme Flemish nationalists, such as the leaders of the 
Vlaams Belang. Instead, this manifesto was created and endorsed by people 
who can best be described as Flemish members of the business and academic 
establishments.
14 The group was chaired by Remi Vermeiren, retired CEO of 
KBC Group Banking Corporation, and included Herman de Bode, the 
Chairman of McKinsey and Company in the Benelux and President of the 
Harvard Club of Belgium. The manifesto provoked an immediate outcry from 
the francophone community and was condemned by the francophone political 
parties and press. Because of a francophone client’s protest, de Bode was forced 
to resign as chair of McKinsey.
15 
Belgium represents a remarkable example of an enduring ethnic conflict 
without any mass violence for over half a century. During the last thirty years a 
political elite within Belgium negotiated a series of compromises that stitched 
together a complex federal system that has held the country together.
16 As a 
result, Belgium has constitutionally evolved from a highly centralized national 
state to one in which the French- and Dutch-language communities and the 
Walloon and Flemish regions have gained a considerable amount of autonomy. 
Today the long-standing language cleavage between the Flemish and the 
Francophones has been embedded into a federal structure of mind-boggling 
complexity that both reflects and reinforces the organization of political, social, 
and cultural life on the basis of language. The good news is that there has been 
 
  11. Id. at 155. 
  12. See  id.  at 132–77. 
  13. Id. at 19. 
  14.  The report was “drawn up by” the “Reflection Group” of sixteen Flemish businessmen and 
academics who had studied Belgium’s problems at the “Warande,” the elite Flemish club in Brussels 
located next to the residence of the American Ambassador to Belgium. So it is not a report “of” the 
Warande. The Manifesto also carries the names of an additional fifty people who “subscribe[d] to [its] 
conclusions . . . and principles.” Id. at 3, 17–18. 
  15.  Luc Van Braekel, McKinsey CEO Calls for End of Belgium, Resigns, BRUSSELS JOURNAL, 
Dec. 13, 2005, http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/565/print. 
  16. See Liesbet Hooghe, Belgium: Hollowing the Center,  in F EDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL 
CLEAVAGES 62–66 (Ugo M. Amoretti & Nancy Bermeo eds., 2004) (noting that decentralization 
negatively correlates with frequency of violent protests). 13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC 9/18/2009  11:05:58 AM 
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practically no bloodshed.
17 Whether or not Belgium survives as a single state, 
there will certainly be no civil war, and history suggests that violence is 
exceedingly unlikely.
18 The bad news, as demonstrated by the political crisis 
following the 2007 federal elections, is that these state reforms brought no 
stability. 
Belgium’s internal conflict poses broader questions relating to the resolution 
of ethnic conflict. One question relates to violence: Why do some internal 
ethnic cleavages with territorial dimensions lead to violent breakups (for 
example, in Yugoslavia), while others are resolved peacefully (for example, in 
Czechoslovakia)? Obviously, this question has no single answer, but the study 
of Belgium can suggest some useful hypotheses and inform speculation. 
The second question relates to federalism: To what extent can a nation with 
ethnic cleavages be created or held together through institutional design? Here 
the study of Belgium leads us to more-pessimistic conclusions. Federal 
structures allowing for decentralized decision-making may exacerbate 
centrifugal forces and hasten the eventual breakup of the nation. If this is so, 
what role can federal structures play in other countries with ethnic cleavages 
that have territorial dimensions where there is a history of violence? Iraq and 
the Congo come to mind. 
This article is organized as follows: Because the present conflict can be 
understood only in historical context, section II uses a marriage metaphor to 
introduce a brief history of Belgium. Section III describes Belgium today and 
the current tensions between the Francophones and the Flemish. It lays out the 
remarkably complex structure of Belgium’s present-day political institutions as 
the politically negotiated responses to a set of persistent problems. Section IV 
looks to the future: we speculate about whether there is sufficient “glue” to 
hold Belgium together and describe the range of possible outcomes. In section 
V, we offer some preliminary thoughts about the lessons from the Belgian 
experience. 
II 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Metaphor 
Although the linguistic frontier is centuries old, the Belgian state is of much 
more-recent origin. Belgium became a nation only in 1830, and its creation was 
 
  17. See  id. at 62–64.
 
  18. The closest the country ever came to widespread violent strife was in 1951. The conflict 
concerned the “royal question”—whether King Leopold III, who was thought to have collaborated 
with the Nazis, should retain the throne. There was a general strike in which a few protesters were 
killed. Because it appeared the country might be on the brink of civil war, a compromise was 
engineered in which Leopold III abdicated in favor of his son. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 111–12. See 
generally J AN  VELAERS  &  HERMAN  VAN  GOETHEM, LEOPOLD  III:  DE  KONING, HET LAND, DE 
OORLOG (1994). 13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC 9/18/2009  11:05:58 AM 
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not the culmination of a single people, with a shared sense of Belgian identity, 
achieving nationhood. Instead, the new state was essentially the product of an 
arranged marriage between spouses who had little in common, the result of a 
nineteenth-century compromise among the Great Powers interested in creating 
a neutral buffer. The Flemish and the Francophones have lived together 
peacefully for a number of years, but today the spouses are leading increasingly 
separate lives. We offer the following metaphor to encapsulate the history of 
the relationship between the two groups, and to frame Belgium’s current 
dilemmas. 
A French-speaking woman from a sophisticated and prosperous bourgeois 
family married a Dutch-speaking Flemish man from peasant stock with little 
money. From the outset, there were tensions in the marriage. The wife’s family 
has always believed she married beneath her station. Because her family had the 
money, during the early years of the marriage the husband found himself quite 
dependent on it. Language was a big problem. The wife insisted on speaking only 
French and expected her husband and even his family to become fluent in French 
if he and they were to succeed. She did not object to the husband’s using his 
language with his peasant friends or out in the fields, but she disallowed its use in 
the house or at formal social occasions. 
During most of the marriage, the wife and her family dominated the marital 
relationship, economically and socially. In the years following World War II, 
however, the economic position of the wife’s family eroded substantially, while 
the husband and his family prospered. As a result, their economic positions were 
eventually reversed. Over time the husband became more insistent on using his 
own language when it pleased him, and he now takes greater pride in his family’s 
history and achievements. However, the psychological postures of the spouses 
have not changed as radically as these external changes might suggest. The 
husband still has vivid memories of past mistreatment, and tends to see himself as 
the victimized underdog. He remains resentful of what he often sees as his wife’s 
condescending attitude and continuing (and in his mind, undeserved) sense of 
superiority. 
In recent years, by mutual agreement, the spouses have come to lead separate 
and largely independent lives, although their marital property remains 
commingled. Today, they quarrel a great deal about money. The husband resents 
the wife’s profligate spending habits, her continued dependence on his wealth, 
and her unwillingness to work outside the home. They have sharply contrasting 
political views and social attitudes: the wife is a socialist, and the husband is more 
committed to markets. Although the spouses have always nominally shared the 
same religion (both are Catholic), the husband’s family has always been more 
observant. Still, despite so many conflicts in their marriage, there is no history of 
violence or physical abuse. 
Money has become a bone of contention. The husband has come to question 
whether his wife’s extravagant spending habits will ever change, and he now 
regularly asks himself whether divorce might not be a preferred alternative. He is 13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC 9/18/2009  11:05:58 AM 
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especially concerned that her economic profligacy might soon lead to his 
financial ruin. The wife refuses even to discuss divorce, claiming that their 
marriage is indissoluble, and she insists that marital solidarity requires that he 
continue to use his resources to maintain her lifestyle. The husband also knows 
that were they ever to divorce, the negotiations would probably be acrimonious 
and difficult, and the costs to the husband would be substantial. The family has 
accumulated a great deal of debt, the marital property would have to be divided, 
and the husband knows he would probably have some spousal support 
obligations, at least during a transitional period. The husband is also concerned 
about the reactions of their neighbors to a divorce. 
What worries the husband most about a divorce relates to its impact on their 
sophisticated and cosmopolitan, French-speaking, 16-year-old son, named 
Brussels, who is also a big spender. The husband realizes his wife would 
probably insist on having sole custody. While at times ambivalent about the son 
and resentful of his aristocratic pretensions, the husband feels an emotional 
attachment that would make it difficult for him to give up the child entirely. The 
husband would prefer some form of joint custody and would even consider 
emancipating the youngster, although he realizes that the son lacks the ability to 
support himself. He has told himself, “If there were ever a custody fight, I'm not 
so sure the child would elect to live with his mother, even though French is his 
mother tongue. My son is a big spender, and he knows who really has the money 
in this family.” 
B. The Creation of Belgium 
From the late sixteenth century until the French Revolution, the territory 
that now makes up Belgium essentially consisted of an amalgam of provinces—
some Francophone and some Flemish—controlled first by the Spanish and later 
by the Hapsburgs. For centuries, French was the language spoken in most of the 
southern provinces, while in the Flemish provinces in the north, the people 
spoke various Dutch-German dialects, except for a small bourgeois elite who 
also spoke French. 
As a result of the French Revolution, from 1797 until 1814, this territory was 
absorbed and controlled by France.
19 This generally benefited the Walloon 
region both economically and politically but was resented by the Flemish who 
felt linguistically and religiously constrained.
20 After the fall of Napoleon in 
1815, the Great Powers decided at the Vienna Congress to make what is now 
Belgium part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, ruled by King William 
I of the House of Orange. 
Within the southern part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, a 
strange coalition subsequently emerged whose members shared a deep 
resentment of Dutch rule, but for very different reasons. The liberal bourgeoisie 
 
  19. See  E.H. KOSSMANN, THE LOW COUNTRIES 1780–1940, at 72–81, 686–87 (1978). 
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and francophone aristocracy resented the use of the Dutch language and 
“foreign control.” The Catholic Church, especially influential in Flanders, 
resented and was suspicious of the Netherlands because it was seen as a 
Protestant state. In 1830, shortly after the successful insurrection in Greece and 
the July Revolution in France, this coalition of liberals and Catholics led a 
revolt against Dutch rule, which spread to working classes in Brussels. 
With little bloodshed, a volunteer “Belgian” army (led by officers from 
France) forced the Dutch troops in Brussels to retreat after four days of 
fighting. The Dutch were never able to regain control. Although France wanted 
to reannex the Belgian provinces, Britain protested. A provisional government 
of the Belgian provinces proclaimed independence on October 4, 1830. On 
December 26, 1830, a London Conference of the Great Powers recognized the 
independence of the Belgian people and the new state. In 1831, the Belgian 
National Congress (dominated by the francophone bourgeoisie, consisting of 
Walloons and the Flemish elite) wrote a liberal constitution
21 and created a 
unitary parliamentary state with a constitutional monarch. A German noble, 
Leopold of Saxe Coburg Gotha, (who was, among other things, Queen 
Victoria's uncle
22) was invited to become the first King of the Belgians. The 
Netherlands officially recognized Belgium’s independence only in 1839 when 
the United Kingdom, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and the Netherlands 
signed the Treaty of London that both recognized the independent Kingdom of 
Belgium and (at the United Kingdom’s insistence) agreed to its neutrality. The 
key point of this history is to suggest that before Belgium was created in 1830, 
there was no shared sense of “Belgian” identity, no sense of a single people 
seeking nationhood.
23 
C. Francophone Dominance 
Although the Flemish always outnumbered the French-speakers,
24 
francophone Belgians dominated the new country politically, economically, and 
culturally. French was the language spoken both by the Walloons and by 
 
  21.  The Belgian Constitution was arguably the most liberal in Europe. It recognized fundamental 
freedoms relating to speech, press, religion, education, assembly, and languages, and also included 
provisions relating to the separation of powers. 
  22.  Leopold was to have close family connections to the monarchies in both Great Britain and 
France. Queen Victoria’s mother was Leopold’s sister. Leopold’s first wife was Princess Charlotte 
Augusta, an heiress to the British throne as the only legitimate child of the British Prince Regent (later 
King George IV). She died, however, in 1817. In 1832, Leopold married Louise-Marie d’Orléans, 
daughter of King Louis-Philippe of France. 
  23.  This is not to say that after the creation of Belgium, some historians did not attempt to 
reconstruct a Belgian history demonstrating the prior existence of some sense of peoplehood. For a 
discussion of the use of history to construct a Belgian identity, see generally Louis Vos, Reconstructions 
of the Past in Belgium and Flanders, in SECESSION, HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 179 (Bruno 
Coppieters & Michel Huysseune eds., 2002). 
  24.  There were 2.4 million Dutch-speakers and 1.8 million French-speakers in 1846. André Alen, 
Nationalism–Federalism–Democracy: The Example of Belgium, in 5 REVUE EUROPÉENE DE DROIT 
PUBLIC 41, 45 n.24 (1993) (citing E.H. KOSSMAN, DE LAGE LANDEN 1780–1940, at 118 (2d ed. 1971)). 13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC 9/18/2009  11:05:58 AM 
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Flemish bourgeoisie. During the nineteenth century, the vote extended only to 
wealthy property owners, nearly all of whom were francophone. The Belgian 
National Congress was dominated by Walloons and the francophone Flemish 
elite. 
The constitution created a strong, centralized government modeled after 
France. Although it contained words suggesting language liberty, the national 
policy established through legislation made French Belgium’s “single official 
language.”
25 It was contemplated that through “a policy of assimilation through 
legal and economic influence” French could be imposed in Flanders.
26 Initially, 
the Dutch language was suppressed in all public administration and in state-
sponsored education. French was the only language used in the national 
government, in governmental administration, and in the courts. 
From the outset, the Walloon region also dominated the new nation 
economically. With large coal reserves, this region was among the earliest in 
Europe to industrialize, and it experienced rapid economic growth during the 
nineteenth century.
27 Flanders, on the other hand, relied on subsistence 
agriculture. It had no modern industry: its famed textile facilities had never 
become fully mechanized and floundered in the nineteenth century. Crop 
failures led to a famine and contributed to massive unemployment and severe 
economic hardship.
28 As a result, some Flemish emigrated abroad, while others 
moved to the Walloon region to work in factories and integrated there.
29 
Within Belgium, there was rampant social and economic discrimination 
against those who spoke Dutch. Francophone Belgians viewed the Flemish 
majority who could not speak proper French as uneducated, backward 
peasants, suitable to do manual labor but little else.
30 Because upward social 
mobility required knowledge of French, many Flemish learned French. Indeed, 
until well into the twentieth century, any well-educated Belgian had to learn 
 
  25. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 22. McRae translates the article in the original constitution as 
follows: “The use of the languages spoken in Belgium is optional (facultatif). It can be regulated only by 
law, and only concerning official acts and judicial matters.” The Law of 19 September 1831 declared 
French to be the only official language for the proclamation of Laws and Resolutions. See also ANDRÉ 
ALEN  &  KOEN  MUYLLE, 1 COMPENDIUM VAN HET BELGISCH  STAATSRECHT  §  266  (2008); Kris 
Deschouwer,  Kingdom of Belgium,  in C ONSTITUTIONAL  ORIGINS,  STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE IN 
FEDERAL COUNTRIES 48, 49 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Taylor eds., 2005). 
  26.  M. Camille Huysmanns, The Flemish Question, 9 J. ROYAL INST. INT’L AFF. 680, 680 (1930). 
 27.  REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 63–64. 
  28. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 23–24. 
  29. See  REFLECTION  GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra  note 7, at 64. This explains the large 
number of Flemish-sounding family names in Wallonia. All Flemish immigrants “Frenchified” over one 
generation. 
  30. See  Luc Huyse, Political Conflict in Bicultural Belgium, in CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE IN 
BELGIUM 107, 109–10 (Arendt Lijphart ed., 1981). 13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC 9/18/2009  11:05:58 AM 
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French, and some bourgeois Flemish even spoke French at home.
31 Few 
Walloons ever bothered to learn Dutch.
32 
D. The Evolution of Language Policy: The Flemish Movement 
Needless to say, many Flemish resented their inability to use their own 
language, even in their dealings with the government. Until the 1870s, all trials 
in Belgium—criminal as well as civil—were conducted exclusively in French.
33 
Sometimes, scandalous miscarriages of justice resulted. The best known case, 
which has become central to the Flemish narrative, involved the wrongful 
conviction and execution of two Flemish defendants accused of murder.
34 After 
they had been guillotined, another person confessed to the crime, and a 
subsequent investigation suggested that the defendants could not understand 
French, that their attorney knew no Dutch, and that the francophone judge had 
relied on a mistranslation of a conversation overheard by a jailer.
35 The public 
outcry eventually led to a change in the law in 1873, permitting both Dutch and 
French to be used in criminal trials in Flanders. In the decade that followed, 
laws were changed to permit Dutch to be used in administrative matters and in 
secondary education.
36 
Between 1890 and 1920, contemporaneous with constitutional amendments 
that extended suffrage to men who were not property owners,
37 a “Flemish 
Movement” emerged.
38 A major focus of this movement related to language 
rights. Under pressure from the Flemish movement, a bilingual regime of sorts 
was established in Flanders. Laws were put on the books providing for greater 
equality between the French and Dutch languages, at least in Flanders. The 
1898 “Law of Equality” nominally recognized the validity of both languages in 
official documents.
39 A 1921 law contemplated that municipal officials might be 
bilingual.
40 Nevertheless, these written laws did not substantially change actual 
 
  31. See  MCRAE, supra note 5, at 39–40 (referring to a “domestic colonialism” and stating that 
“[t]his socioeconomic dimension of the linguistic boundary within the Flemish region has incontestably 
heightened linguistic tensions”). 
  32.  This asymmetry persists. See Victor Ginsburgh & Shlomo Weber, La Dynamique Des Langues 
En Belgique [The Dynamics of Languages in Belgium], 42 REGARDS ECONOMIQUES 1, 4 (2006). 
 33.  ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, §§ 266–67. 
 34.  MCRAE, supra note 5, at 24–25. 
  35. Id. 
  36. Dutch was legally permitted for use in administrative matters in 1878 and in secondary 
education in 1883. Alen, supra note 24, at 46 n.28 (citation omitted). 
  37.  In 1893, the Belgian Constitution was amended to give non-property-owning men one vote, 
while allowing multiple votes to those who did own property. A 1920 amendment created universal 
male suffrage, by which all men had a single vote. Full suffrage was not extended to women until 1948. 
  38.  There is a vast literature on the Flemish movement. See generally Theo Hermans, Louis Vos 
and Lode Wils, THE FLEMISH MOVEMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1992); Huysmanns, supra 
note 26; François Nielsen, The Flemish Movement in Belgium After World War II: A Dynamic Analysis, 
45 AM. SOC. REV. 76 (1980). 
  39. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 266. 
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practices. The Walloon region remained exclusively francophone, and the 
Flemish areas were said to be bilingual; but even in Flanders, many government 
officials spoke only French.
41 
With respect to education, the hope in the nineteenth century was that the 
entire country would eventually become francophone. Although there were 
Church-supported primary schools in Flanders where Dutch was used, state-
supported schools were predominantly francophone. A 1914 law explicitly 
recognized for the first time “the right” of children in elementary schools to be 
educated in their mother tongue, but there were still very few Flemish, state-
supported, municipal primary or secondary schools.
42 Change with respect to 
higher education also came slowly, as it was taught primarily in French during 
all of the nineteenth and more than half of the twentieth century. During World 
War I, the Germans occupied much of Flanders and allowed instruction at the 
University of Gent in Dutch. Notwithstanding pressure from the Flemish 
movement, the Belgian government waited until 1930—more than ten years 
after the war had ended—to allow the full “Netherlandization” of the 
University of Gent.
43 
A critical change with respect to language policies occurred in 1932 and 
1935, when for purposes of governmental activities, two monolingual regions 
were created on the basis of a territorial line dividing the country into two 
parts.
44 The use of language in administrative matters, primary and secondary 
education, and judicial matters was to be based exclusively on location—not the 
mother tongue of the individual citizen. In Flanders, Dutch became the only 
official language, and in the Walloon region, the official language was 
exclusively French. Brussels and certain border areas were said to be bilingual. 
In other words, on the basis of a territorial principle, Belgium was divided into 
two monolingual regions. With the exception of Brussels, the national language 
policy essentially became one of dual monolingualism, based on the principle of 
territorial location, not bilingualism, with language rights attaching to 
individuals.
45 Some commentators suggest that the latter alternative of making 
the entire country officially bilingual probably would have satisfied the Flemish 
movement at the time. But this alternative would have been politically 
impossible because of the reluctance of Francophones to provide Flemish 
language rights for those Flemish living in Wallonia, combined with the 
unwillingness of francophone bureaucrats to learn Dutch. 
 
  41. See  id. at 28. 
 42.  Huysmanns,  supra note 26, at 688. 
  43. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 28. 
  44. See  id. at 150–51. 
  45.  Alen describes the emergence of what he calls the “principle of territoriality” in linguistic 
legislation in 1932 and 1935. Alen, supra note 24, at 49. The language frontier became firm and final 
with the Language Act of 8 November 1962. ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 271; MCRAE, supra 
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E. The Reversal of Economic Roles: Flemish Prosperity 
For more than a century after the establishment of the Belgian nation, the 
Walloons were economically dominant. Today, Flanders is much more 
prosperous than the Walloon region. The relative wealth of the two regions has 
been reversed for two reasons. First, because of the decline of the coal and steel 
industries in Wallonia (which had been the region’s backbone), jobs were lost 
and there was little foreign investment to create some alternative. In the 
meantime, Flanders enjoyed a period of industrial modernization. The Flemish 
port of Antwerp prospered, and new plants were built for thriving industries 
such as car assembly and shipbuilding. Foreign investment poured into the 
region.
46 
By the mid-1960s, the Flemish gross regional product per capita surpassed 
that of Wallonia.
47 Today, the Flemish region of the country is substantially 
richer than the Walloon region. Now the per capita GDP of Flanders exceeds 
that of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom,
48 while that of the Walloon 
region is similar to the level of the poorest regions in France and Italy.
49 The 
unemployment rates
50 and the high-school drop-out rates
51 in the Walloon 
region are both twice those of Flanders. 
F. The Changing Institutional Structure 
Since 1970, contemporaneous with the economic rise of the Flemish region, 
numerous constitutional revisions have transformed Belgium’s governmental 
structure from a strong, unitary, national system into a federal structure of 
mind-boggling complexity, in which substantial power has devolved to 
monolingual, sub–national governmental units. 
One scholar described this process of constitutional devolution, which came 
about through a series of negotiations at the national parliamentary level, as a 
“hollowing of the center, in which resources and competencies were bartered 
away to maintain peace.”
52 
Today, Belgium’s constitution allocates power and responsibility to 
governments for each of three language communities (French, Flemish, and 
 
 46.  REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 51–53. 
 47.  Hooghe,  supra note 16, at 57. 
 48.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS 2005: BELGIUM 102 
(2005),  available at http://www2.vlaanderen.be/ned/sites/werk/documenten/euro_oecd_ec_sv.pdf. In 
2003, Flanders’ per capita GDP was 116.9% of the EU-25 average, while the Walloon region’s was only 
85%.  
 49.  Ludo  Beheydt,  The Linguistic Situation in the New Belgium, in LANGUAGES IN CONTACT AND 
CONFLICT:  CONTRASTING  EXPERIENCES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM 48, 53–54 (Sue 
Wright & Helen Kelly eds., 1995). 
 50.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 48, at 100. 
 51.  REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 38. 
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German)
53 and for three territorially based regions (Wallonia, Flanders, and 
Brussels Capital).
54 The communities and regions have separate, directly 
elected, parliamentary-style legislatures, a legislatively accountable executive 
body,
55 and broad and exclusive policy responsibility and authority in specified 
areas. 
The communities have authority for education and schools, for all language 
policies, for cultural matters, including support of the arts, and for family and 
youth policies, among other things. The regions have authority for what are said 
to be the “territory-related issues.” These include a broad range of policies 
relating to economic development, the environment, agriculture, housing, water 
and energy, transport, and public works. The regions also have the authority to 
enter into international treaties with respect to matters concerning these 
regional competences. Although the regions have some taxing authority, 
revenues are raised primarily at the national level. Nevertheless, through block 
grants and other transfers, the expenditures of funds and the allocation of 
resources have been substantially transferred down to the regional and 
community level.
56 
The Belgian federation is not hierarchical: the subunits have exclusive 
legislative and administrative powers within their areas of competence. The 
federal government cannot impose uniform standards on the regions or 
communities. All are on equal footing, subject to the constitution. This allows 
and even stimulates independent and autonomous policymaking.
57 
As a result of these changes, political life in Belgium is now conducted along 
linguistic lines. No longer does any major political party operate on both sides 
of the linguistic frontier: because of internal conflicts relating to language and 
cultural autonomy, all three major parties—the Christian Democrats, the 
Liberals, and the Socialists—have now split into separate French-speaking and 
 
  53. The Flemish Community governs the Dutch-language area but is also competent for the 
Flemish organizations (for example, schools, museums, and the orchestra) in the Brussels Capital 
Region. The same goes for the French Community, which covers the French-language area, and the 
French organizations in the Brussels Capital Region. DE BELGISCHE GRONDWET, LA CONSTITUTION 
BELGE,  DIE  VERFASSUNG  BELGIENS [Constitution] art. 127–28 (Belg.). The German-speaking 
Community consists of the German-language area. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 253. 
  54.  The Flemish Region comprises the Dutch-language area; the Walloon Region consists of the 
French- and German-language areas; and the Brussels Capital Region includes the bilingual-language 
area. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 254. 
  55.  Flanders decided early on to combine the language-based “Flemish community” parliament 
with the Flemish regional parliament. The result is that there are a total of six, rather than seven, 
parliamentary-style elected legislatures, each of which has a government. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra 
note 25, §§ 257–59. 
 56.  Hooghe,  supra note 16, at 78–79. The latest reform in 2000 (Lambermont) transferred revenues 
from the income tax and the value-added tax to regions and communities, using a formula that enables 
the Francophones to pay for their community’s education deficit. See REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE 
WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 110–12 (discussing “the Lambermont jungle” and the resulting transfer of 
taxation authority to the regions). 
  57.  Jan Beyers & Peter Bursens, The European Rescue of the Federal State: How Europeanization 
Shapes the Belgian State, 29 W. EUR. POL. 1057, 1060 (2006). 13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC 9/18/2009  11:05:58 AM 
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Flemish parties.
58 In the national elections, citizens must vote in geographically 
defined areas—choosing exclusively from party lists of their own language 
group. A person who lives in Flanders must vote for a Dutch-speaking party. 
Similarly, a person voting in the Walloon region must choose a French-speaking 
party. With the limited exception of the Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde area,
59 these 
six parties do not compete in the national parliamentary elections.
60 Nor do 
political parties compete across the language line in the community and 
regional elections, except in the Brussels Capital Region.
61 
In the French-speaking areas, the French-speaking Socialist Party was the 
largest party for many decades, with the French Liberal Party typically second, 
although in the June 2007 elections the French-speaking Liberal Party for the 
first time displaced the Socialist Party as the largest. The francophone Christian 
Democrats typically run a somewhat distant third. In the Flemish areas, the 
Flemish Christian Democratic Party has most often been the largest party, 
although the Flemish Liberal party did better in the 1999 and 2003 national 
elections. The 2007 national elections again brought the Christian Democrats to 
the number-one position. The Flemish socialist party is typically smaller and 
lost many seats in the 2007 election. A fourth major Flemish party, the Vlaams 
Belang, is an extreme right wing Flemish nationalist (some say fascist) party 
that calls for Flemish independence and restrictions on immigrants and 
immigration. This party was even the largest in Flanders in the 2004 regional 
elections and the second largest in the recent 2009 regional elections.
62 All this 
history suggests that ideologically, the socialist tradition is much stronger in the 
Walloon region, while the Catholic party is much stronger in the Flemish 
region. 
At the national level, a variety of mechanisms ensure that neither the 
Flemish nor the francophone parties, acting on their own, can impose decisions 
on the other language group. A governing majority in Parliament always 
requires a coalition government, and the Belgian constitution requires that the 
cabinet have an equal number of ministers from each language group, apart 
from the Prime Minister. This means that the coalitions necessarily cross 
 
  58.  As early as the 1930s, the Catholic Christian Democratic party had divided into two linguistic 
“wings”—one Flemish and one French-speaking—over the issue of Flemish cultural autonomy, and 
later in 1967, the Christian Democrats formally split into two separate parties as a result of the conflict 
surrounding the Catholic University of Leuven/Louvain. Similarly, in the 1960s and ’70s, as Walloon 
economic conditions declined, Walloon nationalist parties sprouted up, with federalist–socialist 
agendas, which threatened the larger Socialist Party and led to its division in the 1970s. The national 
Liberal Party also broke up along Flemish and francophone lines in 1968. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 59–
61. 
  59. See  infra IV.A.3. 
 60.  Kris  Deschouwer,  Falling Apart Together: The Changing Nature of Belgian Consociationalism: 
1961–2001, 37 ACTA POLITICA 68, 79 (2002). 
 61.  Deschouwer,  supra note 25, at 60. 
  62.  There is also a French-speaking right-wing nationalist party (the FN), but it has only one 
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language lines, and typically include at least four of the six major parties.
63 In 
what is known as the cordon sanitaire, the six major parties have agreed never 
to include the Flemish nationalists (the Vlaams Belang) in the governing 
coalition—not so much because of its persistent calls for Flemish independence 
as because of the Vlaams Belang’s fascist antecedents and racist hostility to 
immigrants. Each deputy in the national House of Representatives, elected for 
four year terms by proportional representation from party lists in 
geographically defined districts, is assigned to either the French group or the 
Dutch group, depending on the language of the electoral district.
64 
Constitutional amendments and certain “special laws” require concurrent 
majorities from each language group as well as a two-thirds overall majority. 
Representatives also negotiate in the shadow of an “alarm bell procedure,” 
which, although rarely invoked, carries with it the threat that the government 
will fall. This procedure enables a seventy-five-percent majority of either 
language group to suspend the enactment of proposed legislation expected to 
adversely affect that language group. If invoked, the procedure requires that the 
matter be referred to the government for further consideration and negotiation, 
which must give motivated advice in thirty days. 
III 
BELGIUM TODAY: TWO PEOPLES IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY 
Early in the twentieth century, King Albert I was told by a Walloon political 
leader, “[Sire,] You reign over two peoples. In Belgium, there are Walloons and 
Flemish; there are no Belgians.”
65 This statement is an overstatement if it is 
meant to suggest that a Belgian identity counts for nothing.
66 Some attitudes are 
held in common by those on both sides of the language divide, including a 
pragmatic willingness to compromise and a skepticism of government. Flemish 
and Walloons alike take pride in the restaurant scene in Belgium (which is said 
to have more Michelin stars per capita than France) and share a love for 
outstanding food and drink. Nevertheless, survey evidence suggests that for 
most, their identity as Belgians is thin, at least in comparison to their local or 
regional identity.
67 No one knows the words of the national anthem, and 
 
  63. See LIESBET  HOOGHE, A  LEAP IN THE DARK:  NATIONALIST  CONFLICT AND FEDERAL 
REFORM IN BELGIUM 6 (1991). Since 60% of the population is Flemish, the unstated presumption has 
been that the prime minister will be Flemish—not since the 1970s has a Walloon had the top position. 
  64.  Except for the Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde district, which includes both the Brussels Capital 
region and some surrounding suburbs, all of the electoral districts are monolingual. 
  65.  Jules Destrée, LETTRE AU ROI SUR LA SÉPARATION DE LA WALLONIE DE LA FLANDRE 
[LETTER TO THE KING ON THE SEPARATION OF WALLONIA AND FLANDERS], translated in Alen, 
supra note 25, at 47. 
  66. See  Wilfried Swenden & Maarten Theo Jans, “Will It Stay or Will It Go?” Federalism and the 
Sustainability of Belgium, 29 W. EUR. POL. 877, 889 (2006) (suggesting that the younger Flemish are 
more willing to identify with Belgium, possibly because they lack firsthand experience with linguistic 
discrimination). 
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Belgium is one of least nationalistic countries in the world. One Belgian 
political scientist, suggesting a state might be defined as a network of 
communication,
68 expressed pessimism about Belgium’s future: “In Belgium, 
there is little communication. There are separate media, extreme social 
segregation, separate political parties and more and more authority in separate 
hands.”
69 
Belgians are quick to note the real cultural differences between the 
Walloons and the Flemish. The conventional wisdom is that the Flemish are 
more disciplined and harder working, like the Northern European, Germanic 
cultures, while the Walloons take after the more fun-loving Latins in Southern 
Europe.
70 Some political and ideological differences are conspicuous: the 
socialist tradition is stronger in the Walloon region, and the Flemish are more 
committed to a market economy.
71 Whereas nearly every Belgian is nominally 
Catholic, the Flanders region has a higher proportion of observant Catholics 
than the more secular Walloon region.
72 
What seems incontestable today is that within Belgium, the language 
cleavage has been embedded into a governmental structure that reinforces the 
sense that there are “two peoples” who are likely, in time, to drift farther apart 
and not closer together. Ordinary citizens may participate in the political 
process only among their own language group. There are no mass media—that 
is, national newspapers, television stations, or radio stations—aimed at both the 
French- and Dutch-speaking communities. The daily newspapers are exclusively 
Dutch, French, or German.
73 Television and radio stations have been separate in 
Flanders and Wallonia since 1960,
74 and each community has its own public 
broadcasting organization regulated by its language community, not the 
national government.
75 
The degree of residential and workplace segregation in the Flemish and 
Walloon regions is stunning. Belgians could be described as “living separately 
 
  68. See generally K ARL  W.  DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL  COMMUNICATION:  AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY (1953) (presenting a theory of nationalism as 
linked with and dependent on social communication). 
  69.  Because of promises of confidentiality involved in this and other interviews referenced in this 
article, Law and Contemporary Problems is unable to independently verify their content. These sources 
are on file with the authors. 
  70. See  RUDY AERNOUDT, VLAANDEREN WALLONIË, JE T’AIME, MOI NON PLUS 17–35 (2006). 
  71. See  Marleen Brans, Christian De Visscher & Diederik Vancoppenolle, Administrative Reform 
in Belgium: Maintenance or Modernisation?, 29 W.  EUR.  POL.  979, 992–95 (2006) (discussing the 
evidence on cultural differences between Flanders and Wallonia regarding organizational reforms in 
government). 
 72.  MCRAE, supra note 5, at 65–71. 
  73. See  id.  at 249–51 (discussing the history of the press in Belgium). 
 74.  Deschouwer,  supra note 25, at 50; see also MCRAE, supra note 5, at 237–49 (discussing the 
history of Belgian broadcasting). 
  75.  Belgian newspapers, however, are self-regulated by a single association, the Federation of 
Editors, BBC  NEWS,  COUNTRY  PROFILE:  BELGIUM, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_pro 
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together.” Very few who reside or commute to work in Wallonia are Dutch-
speaking or Flemish.
76 And vice versa: Flemish businessmen in prosperous 
southwest Flanders complain that because even unemployed Walloons are 
unwilling to commute to Flanders, they often hire workers from neighboring 
France.
77 Within Brussels (where French is spoken in 85% of homes, Dutch in 
between 10% and 20%
78), there is a modest degree of residential integration. 
The Brussels workplace tends to be more integrated because many Flemish 
people who live in Flanders commute to Brussels for work.
79 
Although Belgium is a small country, Flemish and Walloons interact socially 
surprisingly little. Millions of Belgians are unable to communicate because they 
cannot speak each other’s language. The degree of linguistic segregation in the 
schools—from the elementary level through the universities—is striking. At all 
levels, the curriculum of any particular school is typically taught exclusively in 
either French or Dutch. Though some families intentionally cross-enroll their 
children so that they might better learn the other language, these are 
exceptions. 
Nor is there a shared national commitment to make Belgians bilingual.
80 
Elementary schools, beginning in the fourth grade, do offer a few hours per 
week of instruction in the other language, but few Walloons ever learn to speak 
Dutch with any degree of fluency. In the year 2000, researchers found that in 
Wallonia, 17% knew Dutch in addition to French.
81 Only 7% were trilingual.
82 
The proportion of multilingual Flemish people was much higher: 57% knew 
French and Dutch, and 40% knew English as well.
83 Compared to a generation 
ago, it is our impression that fewer Flemish speak French fluently now, 
probably because of the increasing dominance of English. 
IV 
WHITHER BELGIUM? 
The language cleavage is now embedded in and reinforced by Belgian’s 
federal structure. Does the current structure represent a stable equilibrium, or 
have these changes instead set into motion centrifugal forces that are likely to 
 
  76.  The vast majority (about 90%) of all commuting is toward Brussels. Commuting between 
Flanders and Wallonia is very limited (about 1% of all commuting). REFLECTION  GROUP  “IN DE 
WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 63. 
  77.  Confidential interview.  See supra note 69. 
 78.  Hooghe,  supra note 16, at 57; Deschouwer, supra note 25, at 51. 
  79. See  REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 63; MCRAE, supra note 5, at 76–
77. 
  80.  Early in March 2007, the francophone socialist leader Elio di Rupo argued in favor of creating 
bilingual schools in Brussels and surroundings. This measure was opposed by the Flemish Minister of 
Education. See Frans De Smet, Di Rupo wil tweetalige scholen langs taalgrens, HET NIEUWSBLAD, Mar. 
11, 2007, http://www.nieuwsblad.be/Article/Detail.aspx?articleID=do19fctr. 
  81.  Ginsburgh & Weber, supra note 32, at 4. 
  82. Id. 
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lead to further devolution and possibly state separation? What are the divisive 
issues that might destabilize the present equilibrium? In Belgium, ethnic 
federalism has enabled the regions to develop a full range of separate 
governmental institutions that would seem to lower the costs of Flemish 
secession. What “glue” is there to hold the country together, particularly in the 
face of a serious economic or political shock? 
A. The Issues 
Belgium’s present-day federal structure can best be understood as a 
complex set of compromises that was the product of a series of protracted 
political negotiations that sought to deal with four problems, none of which has 
been completely put to rest. 
1. Language and the Quest for Autonomy 
The Flemish movement was originally concerned primarily with language 
rights and cultural equality. Francophone social dominance is at the origin of 
the conflict.
84 The combination of Flemish pressure, on the one hand, and 
francophone resistance to a bilingual regime that would require French-
speaking government officials to learn Dutch, on the other, resulted in a scheme 
of territorial monolingualism that was established in the 1930s. Over time, 
however, the concerns of the Flemish movement broadened: “[I]t became 
gradually more nationalist and autonomist in response to the slow adaptation of 
the Belgian–francophone institutions and growing anti-Flemish sentiment 
among French-speaking politicians.”
85 In 1970, major constitutional reform was 
brought by the joint request of the Flemish, who wanted cultural autonomy, and 
the Walloons, who desired more autonomy for economic reform. It led to an 
asymmetric federalism with communities (linked to language and culture) and 
regions (linked to territory).
86 The process did not stop there, and between the 
1970s and today, the Flemish parties succeeded, through negotiations, in 
creating a federal system that gives both sides the power to make policy for a 
broad range of issues.
87 
 
 84.  DUTILLEUL, supra note 2, at 53 (quoting the journalist Guido Fonteyn). 
 85.  Hooghe,  supra note 16, at 59.  
  86.  The fifth of five Flemish Resolutions of March 3, 1999, emphasizes the principle of language 
territoriality, as well as a demand for supervision rights for the regions on appointments in several 
federal institutions. See Op 3 maart 1999 worden er vijf resoluties i.v.m. de volgende staatshervorming 
aangenomen, Mar. 3, 1999, available at http://www.vlaamsparlement.be/vp/informatie/informatheek/ 
informatiedossiers/vlaamsegrondwet/vijf_resoluties.htm. 
  87.  This devolution involved a series of trades over time. The Walloons typically agreed to grant 
more authority to the regions and communities only if the Flemish agreed to provide greater subsidies 
for the Walloon region and francophone community. The 1993 Saint Michael Agreement and the 2000 
Lambermont Agreement followed this pattern. See ELS WITTE, JAN CRAEYBECKX & ALAIN MENNEN, 
POLITIEKE GESCHIEDENIS VAN BELGIË: VAN 1830 TOT HEDEN 447–53 (2005); REFLECTION GROUP 
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The conflict today relates to the Flemish pressure to go farther. Many within 
Flanders want still greater autonomy and devolution to a confederal system, 
and some (as the Manifesto suggests) seek Flemish independence. Francophone 
Belgians object to further moves toward regional or communal autonomy. With 
respect to language rights, the Flemish vehemently insist on the principle of 
territoriality, while the Francophones (especially in the parts of Flanders 
adjacent to Brussels) now suggest that language rights be attached to the person 
of a citizen, entitling him to speak his own language in his dealings with 
government. In the thirties, the reverse was true. The Francophones demanded 
territorial monolingualism: French ought to be the exclusive language in the 
South, and Dutch in the North.
88 The Flemish now strongly oppose any 
deviations from the territorial principle and do not accept any official language 
other than Dutch on Flemish soil.
89 This conflict between territoriality and 
personality is at the heart of numerous debates between the two groups.
90 
2. Minority Protection vs. Majority Rule 
Belgian democracy is not based on majority rule but instead provides an 
example of a “consociational democracy,”
91 in which proportional 
representation, executive power sharing and grand coalitions, and minority 
vetoes are key elements.
92 At the national level in Belgium, in response to 
Francophones’ fear that they might be outvoted and dominated politically by 
the Flemish majority, Belgium has put in place a variety of institutional 
mechanisms that prevent Flemish domination through majority rule. Because of 
the alarm-bell procedure, the requirement of concurrent linguistic majorities for 
special laws, equal representation in the national government, and a multiparty 
political system that requires coalitions, the francophone political parties have 
considerable leverage in the national Parliament to ensure that their interests 
are taken into account in any negotiated deal.
93 
 
  88. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 150–51. 
  89.  For a summary of the history of the language conflict from the Flemish perspective, see the 
official site of the Flemish Government, http://www2.vlaanderen.be/taalwetgeving/eeuw_taalwetten 
.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). 
  90. See  infra  IV.A.3. 
  91. See Brendan O’Leary, Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory 
Arguments,  in  FROM  POWER  SHARING TO DEMOCRACY:  POST-CONFLICT  INSTITUTIONS IN 
ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 3, 26 (Sid Noel ed., 2005) (surveying “consociational thinking” and 
suggesting that Belgium is an example of a state successfully managing its consociational difficulties); 
see also Brendan O’Leary, An Iron Law of Nationalism and Federation: A (Neo-Diceyian) Theory of 
the Necessity of Federal Staatsvolk and of Consociational Rescue, 7 NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 273, 
288–91 (2001) (constructing a Herfindahl–Hirschman index to measure the number of politically 
effective cultural groups in various countries, and noting a similarity between Belgium’s score and the 
scores of other nations often described as having consociational institutions). 
 92.  See generally Deschouwer, supra note 60; George Tsebelis, Elite Interaction and Constitution 
Building in Consociational Democracies, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5 (1990). 
 93.  Kris  Deschouwer,  Consociational Democracy and Belgian Politics in the Twenty-First Century, 
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In actual operation, the system’s consociational features and the complex 
fragmentation of authority make coherent policy extremely difficult.
94 
Moreover, because the regions and communities lack general fiscal autonomy 
and are dependent on federal grants and shared tax revenues, critical 
negotiations occur at the national level, in a complex set of intergovernmental 
mechanisms devoted to policy coordination.
95 Many Flemish resent the 
antimajoritarian elements as undemocratic and are frustrated by their inability 
to develop coherent polices for their region. Yet the Flemish required the same 
protective mechanisms in Brussels, where they are a minority.
 96 
3. Brussels 
The Brussels metropolitan area presents a special problem for Belgium 
because of its physical location, its history, and its growth. Brussels is physically 
situated in Flanders, and in the mid-nineteenth century a majority of the city’s 
inhabitants were Flemish.
97 Today Brussels is no longer a Flemish city. In fact, it 
has become overwhelmingly francophone.
98 The negotiated compromise was to 
make the nineteen municipalities of Brussels into a separate, bilingual Brussels 
Capital Region that is not part of either Flanders or Wallonia, which are 
monolingual. In order to protect the Flemish minority within Brussels from 
francophone domination, the governmental structure of the Brussels Capital 
Region has several antimajoritarian rules akin to those in the national 
government structure.
99 Flemish residents of Brussels are guaranteed the right 
not only to use their language in administrative dealings with the government, 
but also to have Dutch-speaking schools. 
Brussels remains a point of political contention because metropolitan 
Brussels extends well beyond the nineteen municipalities in the Brussels Capital 
Region. Over the years, an increasing number of French speakers have acquired 
homes in the surrounding areas.
100 The Flemish fear and resent what they see as 
the creeping “Frenchification” of these Flemish areas.
101 In 1962, Dutch 
speakers pushed for and secured legislation to establish a fixed linguistic border 
 
  94.  For example, social insurance, including health insurance, is a federal matter, but public-health 
policies are said to be a community competence. The communities govern education but the regions 
control school transport, while the national government controls teachers’ pensions and sets standards 
for professional qualifications. The main social-policy instruments relating to income redistribution 
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around Brussels.
102 But as part of a political compromise, some of the suburban 
municipalities that are not part of Brussels proper have received linguistic 
“facilities.” These facilities entitle Francophones living in these particular 
Flemish municipalities to deal with the municipal authorities in French.
103 From 
the Flemish perspective, this compromise was seen at the time as a temporary 
violation of the territorial principle, to enable those francophone citizens to 
integrate and learn Dutch.
104 From the Francophone’s perspective, this forty-
five-year-old exception to the territorial principle is now seen to suggest that 
language rights should adhere to the individual and therefore should be a 
permanent and personal privilege. The conflicting perspectives came to a head 
in November 2007, when the Flemish Minister of Internal Affairs refused to 
appoint and recognize three francophone mayors in these particular 
municipalities located within the Flemish region because of their refusal to 
comply with Dutch-language regulations. For the same reason the Minister also 
annulled several resolutions of municipal council meetings conducted in French. 
A related flash point concerns the Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde electoral and 
judicial district, a single district that includes both the officially bilingual 
Brussels Capital Region core as well as the nominally monolingual Dutch area, 
Halle–Vilvoorde, which surrounds it.
 The Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde electoral 
district was created as another part of the 1962 political compromise. The net 
effect of having this electoral district, which is larger than Brussels itself, is that 
in national elections francophone residents in Halle or Vilvoorde can vote for 
francophone parties from the Brussels Capital Region and for candidates who 
live in Brussels proper and do not reside in the Halle or Vilvoorde areas. It also 
assures the Francophones in that area access to francophone courts. The crisis 
arose as the result of two rulings of the Belgian Constitutional Court that 
having Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde as a single electoral district was inconsistent 
with provisions of the Belgium Constitution that contemplate territorially based 
electoral districts.
105 The Flemish parties insist that the borders of the Brussels 
Capital Region remain fixed and that the electoral district be split so that voters 
in the Halle–Vilvoorde areas are no longer attached to the Capital Region for 
any voting purposes.
106 The francophone parties oppose the split, and ask that 
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six communes with a number of francophone residents be given permanent 
language facilities and even be added to Brussels proper.
107 
This conflict will likely be resolved eventually with some sort of “Belgian 
compromise.” Its practical importance is minor—with respect to national 
electoral power, little turns on how the Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde electoral 
district is reformed. Nevertheless, the conflict has substantial symbolic 
importance on both sides of the language divide and is used for purposes of 
political mobilization. 
4. Regional Economic Differences, Internal Transfers, and Entitlement 
Policies 
A far more important and potentially explosive conflict relates to the 
control and allocation of governmental resources and to Flemish pressures for 
further devolution. In Belgium today, revenues for all levels of government are 
generated primarily by taxes levied at the national level.
108 Because Flanders is 
now much richer than Wallonia, it pays proportionately more of these taxes.
109 
In various past negotiations at the national level, the leaders of the francophone 
parties have exercised their leverage to extract and protect what the Flemish 
parties see as disproportionate internal transfers from the Flemish region to the 
Walloon region and Brussels. A good portion of these transfers occur because 
unemployment insurance, health insurance, and social security (old-age 
retirement benefits, disability) remain national and not regional programs. 
Flemish (who on average have higher incomes) pay more into these programs 
than they receive.
110 
There are now regular calls from the major Flemish political parties for the 
regionalization of some of these national entitlement programs. Flemish 
business leaders are deeply concerned that these programs will destroy 
Flanders’ ability to compete in a global marketplace in the long run and that 
only regionalization will provide safeguards against even greater burdens in the 
years to come.
111 
Many Flemish feel that Flanders is presently tied to an economic region that 
refuses to cooperate in its own rescue, and that the Walloon region risks 
drowning Flanders as well. Moreover, the average Flemish person on the street 
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resents the idea of substantial subsidies from Flanders to the Walloon region.
112 
Others within Flanders, while not hostile to the principle of national solidarity, 
object to the implementation of the existing welfare system, the lack of 
transparency, and the absence of objective criteria.
113 
Many in Flanders also object that the regions lack the policy instruments to 
create efficient economic policies. For example, the Flemish Economic Minister 
lacks the power to grant abatements to the company tax (which is levied at the 
national level) but instead must use subsidies and direct grants to attract new 
industry.
114 Regionalization of these policies is vehemently opposed by the 
francophone parties, especially the socialist party, which sees these national 
entitlements as vitally important to its political base and at the core of the 
party’s political ideology.
115 In sum, these issues are deeply divisive and could 
generate a substantial degree of mass political mobilization on both sides of the 
language divide. 
B. What Glue? 
In light of these and other conflicts between the Flemish and the Walloons, 
what can hold Belgium together, particularly given the centrifugal pressures 
generated by the existing federal regime? One frequently hears, only half in 
jest, that the only truly Belgian institutions are the soccer team and the 
monarchy. But neither provides much glue.
116 Belgium soccer teams have had 
limited success in international competitions, and hardly provide a source for 
much national pride. 
The royal family is plainly committed to holding the country together, and 
King Albert II is well liked among both francophone and Dutch-speaking 
Belgians. If he were to die now, many on both sides of the linguistic divide 
would grieve and fly a Belgian flag at half-mast. But Flemish regularly complain 
that the royal family has always preferred to speak French and has never 
bothered to develop a deep mastery of the Dutch language nor exhibited much 
interest in its culture. The heir apparent, Prince Philippe, is regularly ridiculed 
in the Flemish press as a none-too-bright, awkward bumbler. Some Belgians, 
though, who have had personal and professional dealings with the Prince 
consider him a well-meaning and conscientious man, but one better suited for 
the monarchy in a different age—a person entirely lacking the modern 
communicative and political skills to unite a divided society.
117 One Flemish 
 
  112.  Professor Giuseppe Pagano has called the combination of “profound cultural resentment” and 
expensive transfers an “explosive cocktail.” DUTILLEUL, supra note 2, at 167. 
 113.  AERNOUDT, supra note 70, at 175. 
  114. Id. at 206–12. 
  115.  For an argument that regionalization is inconsistent with the provision of social services, see 
the official website of the francophone socialist party, http://www.ps.be (last visited Apr. 2, 2009). 
  116.  The monarchy provides a strong glue, however, not in itself, but as an important mechanism in 
the creation and continuation of a strong Belgian establishment. See infra IV.B.3. 
  117.  Confidential interview.  See supra note 69. 13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC 9/18/2009  11:05:58 AM 
Spring 2009]  THE FLEMISH AND WALLOONS IN BELGIUM 173 
political leader summed up her faith in the monarchy this way: “The perfect 
Belgian King would have movie star looks, be completely fluent in many 
languages, would be charming, would not be a womanizer or be sexually 
aberrant in any way. How likely are you to get such a person by birth and 
primogeniture?”
118 
One might suppose that a 175-year-old shared history would bind the 
country together. But much of this shared history has not been happy. Although 
today the Flemish region is more prosperous and has considerable autonomy, 
many Flemish still resent language slights and perceived ongoing francophone 
condescension. Two devastating world wars were fought on Belgian soil, and 
during each was a German occupation that led to divisive and bitter postwar 
accusations in which many Flemish felt unfairly accused of collaboration. 
According to one prominent Flemish businessman, “After World War II, 
Walloons accused many Flemish of collaboration. While only a few were ever 
prosecuted, many Flemish felt misunderstood and unfairly tarred. The scars 
from this condemnation still exist in many Flemish families.”
119 S o m e  i n  t h e  
francophone community are very quick to characterize Flemish politics today as 
reflecting fascistic roots that existed before World War II. They see this in the 
electoral strength of the Vlaams Belang, and they regularly condemn the 
Flemish as selfish and lacking in feelings of social solidarity because of their 
express desire to reduce the entitlements of the welfare state. 
The factors that are most likely to hold the country together are (1) Flemish 
fears that Brussels might be lost, (2) a national culture that accepts pragmatic 
compromise and dislikes violence, (3) a strong Belgian establishment including 
a national-political-party elite with experience at problem-solving negotiations, 
and (4) European integration and the European Union. 
1. Brussels 
Today Brussels is not only the capital of Belgium and often characterized as 
the capital of Europe—it is the capital of the Flemish regional government and 
community. For those Flemish pressing for Flemish independence, Brussels 
presents a real political stumbling block. Although Brussels is located within 
what was historically a Flemish-speaking area, it is highly unlikely that a 
majority of this overwhelmingly francophone city, if given a choice, would elect 
to dissolve Belgium to become part of Flanders. Nor would Brussels’ residents 
likely prefer to become part of a new francophone nation over the status quo. 
Francophone residents of Brussels do not identify with the Walloon region or 
its separate culture so much as with the more cosmopolitan, broader French 
culture. Residents of Brussels might also prefer the status quo to dissolution for 
economic reasons: Brussels is not a rich city, and today it benefits from transfers 
from Flanders—both direct and indirect.
120 
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Without describing the process by which it might be achieved, the Manifesto 
suggests that after dissolution of Belgium, Brussels should become a shared 
responsibility of the two new nations as well as the EU, a condominium of 
sorts.
121 In the Manifesto authors’ view Brussels might become a “free city,” that 
is, part of neither new country, but instead the capital of Europe, supported and 
subsidized by the EU.
122 Although such alternatives would presumably be 
acceptable to many in Flanders who prefer independence, a Flemish state bent 
on securing its independence could not unilaterally impose such arrangements. 
Instead, they would have to be created through negotiations that would require 
the agreement of the national francophone parties and the EU and perhaps 
some sort of ratification by the residents of Brussels, as well. But why would the 
francophone parties or the EU agree to such arrangements, which they would 
surely see as paving the way to Flemish independence? 
This raises an important question for the advocates of Flemish 
independence: How likely is it that a majority of Flemish would support 
independence if in the process Flanders risks “losing” Brussels in the sense that 
it could not remain the capital of Flanders or be part of the new Flemish 
nation? In answering this question, one must acknowledge that many Flemish 
have ambivalent feelings toward Brussels. They often express pride in this 
cosmopolitan city and its Flemish roots. But at the same time many Flemish—
especially those who live and work outside the city—feel Brussels has become a 
foreign metropolis filled with immigrants. They often express resentment that 
Brussels is only nominally bilingual, that in reality Dutch is not much used or 
even understood in many shops and restaurants. Notwithstanding this 
ambivalence, Brussels is an important part of the glue that holds the country 
together. Like a father who never files for divorce because he is unwilling to 
give up custody of a child, many Flemish—who might otherwise favor 
independence—would, we suspect, prefer to stay in an unsatisfying Belgian 
marriage in which the spouses lead separate lives rather than give up Brussels. 
Many seem to corroborate this analysis. One important business leader 
supporting the Manifesto confessed he would never favor divorce if it meant 
giving up Brussels.
123 Another agrees with the analysis of the Manifesto but does 
not want dissolution, thinking of himself as a strong federalist.
124 One political 
leader put it quite clearly: “If you ask people in Brussels Central Station[,] ‘Do 
you want Belgium to divide?,’ 75% of the Flemish would oppose. On the other 
hand, if you ask ‘Should Flanders have more autonomy?,’ 75% of the Flemish 
would say yes. The problem of Brussels can’t be solved. Brussels is becoming a 
 
  121. Id.  at 197–207. 
  122. See id. at 201–12 (laying out a plan for reorganizing Brussels as a region separate from Flanders 
and Wallonia, borrowing from the example of Washington, D.C.); TRENDS  REDAKTIE, BRUSSEL, 
WASHINGTON AAN DE ZENNE. EEN PLEIDOOI VOOR BRUSSEL ALS EUROPESE HOOFDSTAD 9 (1989) 
(comparing Brussels to Washington, D.C.). 
  123.  Confidential interview.  See supra note 69. 
  124.  Confidential interview.  See supra note 69. 13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC 9/18/2009  11:05:58 AM 
Spring 2009]  THE FLEMISH AND WALLOONS IN BELGIUM 175 
less francophone and more polyglot community.”
125 He also suggested that even 
with divorce, the underlying problems of immigration, unemployment, social-
security costs, and the need for transfer programs would remain—just on a 
smaller scale. Each region would still need governmental transfer programs.
126 
2. A Pragmatic and Pacifist Culture that Supports Compromise 
Certain elements of a shared culture provide glue that might well hold the 
country together. The experience in the two world wars appears to have 
created—on both sides of the linguistic divide—a strong tendency toward 
pacifism and conflict avoidance. One political leader commented, 
Belgians are conflict averse. Given the history of the country, Belgians have no taste 
for fighting or for wars. Our land has provided the site of battles fought by others, and 
our people have been occupied by the French, the Dutch and the Germans. People in 
this country don’t like the government, and don’t like the army. There is very little 
chauvinism. While the ties with the nation are very thin and there is little state feeling 
or identity, there is not taste for violence.
127 
Fear of the unknown consequences of a divorce, combined with Belgium’s 
current prosperity as a united nation, creates a bias towards the status quo even 
among the Flemish. So long as Flanders remains prosperous—today it ranks 
among the richest regions of the world—many Flemish who might abstractly 
prefer greater Flemish autonomy are reluctant to upset the apple cart and break 
up the Belgian state. Why risk today’s comfort for the possible benefits of 
independence? On the other hand, in an ongoing, deep crisis like we are 
experiencing today, Flemish economic insecurity, coupled with continued 
resentment of subsidies to the Walloon region, might create a greater 
willingness to take the risk. 
An equally important factor that provides “glue” relates to a shared cultural 
commitment throughout Belgium to pragmatism and compromise. Indeed, the 
Belgians use the expression “a Belgian compromise” to describe a deal in which 
difficult issues are resolved in a messy, inefficient, and ambiguous way—in 
which both sides have made concessions but no one understands the long-term 
implications. But these compromises allow ordinary life to go on without undue 
disruption or violence. The history of Belgium in general, and especially the 
history of its constitutional reforms since 1970, is replete with such 
compromises.
128 
3. A Political Elite and National Establishment 
Belgium’s entire federalist design, with its complicated consociational 
mechanisms taking into account and recognizing the interests of both sides, is 
an illustration of such compromise. Notwithstanding this regionalization, a 
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federal political career remains highly attractive.
129 The elites of the various 
political parties have had a great deal of experience negotiating various 
compromises across both language and ideological cleavages. In these 
negotiations the leaders have a great deal of power because the leaders can 
speak for their parties. Belgium is sometimes called a “partocracy” because 
party discipline is absolute; in parliament, deputies vote as their party leaders 
dictate because it is the leaders who substantially influence whether someone is 
a candidate, as well as candidates’ positions on the electoral list.
130 
The need for coalitions to form a government, when combined with the 
various antimajoritarian rules, creates a system in which there is pressure to 
forge some sort of working consensus across party lines.
131 Stalemates do occur, 
and sometimes these cause the government to fall and new elections to be 
called. But the typically protracted negotiations often lead to log-rolling 
compromises, sometimes with further devolution of authority to the regional or 
community level, combined with various side-payments subsidizing the Walloon 
region. One political scientist declared, 
The reforms of the 1970[]s in essence obligated the political elites to be prepared to 
negotiate various compromises because the price of failure was that the government 
would fall. This was a very high price. The elite are and have been very creative in 
avoiding gridlock and negotiating intricate and creative compromises, typically behind 
closed doors. They deal with each other all the time and know each other’s true 
“bottom lines” or reservation points. People were not aware in the 1970[]s of how 
substantial the implications of these changes would be. Not simply a first step to 
“Federalism” but instead a procedural framework that required double majorities.
132 
Complaints about Belgium’s “democratic deficit” relate in some measure to 
the fact that these leaders, behind closed doors, can negotiate deals without 
much public input or dialogue.
133 Leaders are often accused of “selling out” and 
accepting arrangements that are inconsistent with assurances given during 
election campaigns. But over the years, this political elite—because of shared 
cultural commitment across the language cleavage to the peaceful resolution of 
conflict—has provided the glue that has helped hold the country together.
134 
The multilevel and very complex, asymmetrical governance system forces 
party leaders to “conceptuali[z]e their role as the cement that binds the various 
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elements of the system together.”
135 According to some observers, party leaders 
have maintained their dominant position by using the state for their own ends,
136 
while the state itself has used these leaders to provide cohesion to the governing 
process. Corruption and “clientelism” are seen as indispensable for the 
maintenance and continuation of the system.
137 
The Belgian establishment glue extends beyond the political class. Many 
have a stake in the survival of Belgium as a country: business, economic, and 
financial leaders; federal civil servants and diplomats; the heads of employers’ 
organizations and trade unions. The trade unions and mutual health funds 
provide for various social services and, most important, are responsible for the 
administration of unemployment and health benefits. Billions of euros run 
through their hands, all from national social-security programs under the 
control of the federal government. Moreover, during the last twenty years the 
King has systematically worked to broaden this Belgian power base by creating 
a large number of new knights and barons. Many among the Flemish business 
and academic elites are thus co-opted into the national Belgian establishment.
138 
4. Europe 
It is not a simple matter to assess whether on balance European integration 
operates to weaken the national state and strengthen the regions within 
Belgium, or vice versa. On the one hand, some governmental functions are now 
at the supranational level. Furthermore, there are some EU policies that relate 
directly to the regions and bypass the national government. The Treaty of the 
European Union allows regional Ministers to be actively present in meetings of 
the European Council. These realities can be seen as strengthening the regions 
at the expense of the national state. But the rules of the European Council 
require that a nation’s regional representatives in the Council act in unity, and 
take a single position for the national state as a whole, irrespective of the 
underlying constitutional status of the region in that member state.
139 Therefore, 
in some respects the EU forces regions or other subunits of a state to cooperate. 
Numerous cooperative modes of governance have been developed for that 
purpose.
140 
Therefore, although European integration has given subentities in several 
areas a strong role and powers, it has enabled the federal government to 
strengthen its position as a key policymaking player and to occupy a powerful 
gate-keeping position between the domestic regional level and Europe. Even in 
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policy areas in which Europe has made the regions potentially dominant, such 
as the environment and agriculture, the regions have been forced to cooperate 
in order to present a single Belgian position to the EU.
141 
C. The Current Crisis and Alternative Scenarios for the Years Ahead 
The aftermath of the June 2007 federal elections in Belgium brought to 
international attention the profound cleavage existing within contemporary 
Belgium. Over a period of more than six months, all attempts to form a new 
government failed because of the inability to put together the necessary 
coalition of Flemish and francophone parties to create a governing majority. 
The hang-up was disagreement on an agenda for state reform. In desperation, 
just before Christmas 2007, a deal to form a temporary, interim government was 
brokered. 
Only in March 2008 was a permanent government formed. In October 2008 
a “dialogue” among regional representatives began relating to further “reform” 
of the governmental structure. With the economic crisis in November 2008, it 
was “temporarily” suspended. Shortly before Christmas 2008, the Prime 
Minister was forced to resign because of claims of inappropriate interference 
with a judicial proceeding relating to the banking crisis. A successor was 
appointed on December 30, 2008. The June 2009 regional elections have more 
or less confirmed the existing power balance. In sum, more than two years after 
the 2007 national elections, nothing has changed in terms of the basic structure. 
In the long run, what are the conceptual possibilities concerning the future 
of Belgium? We see four options. 
1.  The national government might be strengthened and policies 
adopted to mitigate the language-based cleavage and to strengthen 
Belgian national identity. 
2.  The status quo might be maintained with no significant change in 
governmental structure. 
3.  There might be further devolution of authority to the regions, 
perhaps leading in the long run to a confederation. 
4.  The Flemish might establish an independent state. 
The first outcome is rather unlikely given the existing governmental 
structures and the concomitant interests of various political stakeholders. In 
theory, the engine of history might be “run in reverse,” and Belgium might 
adopt policies to make the entire country bilingual, strengthen the Belgian 
national identity, and augment the powers of the national government. 
However, because the separate language communities control the schools and 
language policy, the national government lacks the authority to require 
bilingual education. It will also be particularly difficult to get the regional 
groups to give up powers they currently have. Path dependency often means 
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that steps, once taken, cannot be retraced. The present attitude—especially in 
Flanders with its desire to do things its own way (what we do ourselves, we do 
better)—and the limited interaction between the regional governments, makes 
this option rather unrealistic. The lack of interaction also restricts the 
opportunities for the governments to learn from each other. Research even 
suggests that many of the negative consequences of the present federal system 
are simply due to the different political cultures and have little to do with the 
state structure.
142 Although the current crisis might reignite Belgian unity and 
state reform might push some competencies down from the federal level while 
re-federalizing others, it seems unlikely that Belgium will ever once again 
become a unitary national state. 
The second outcome, maintaining the structural status quo, would surely be 
preferred by many in the Walloon region. During the six months following the 
June 2007 elections, it appeared that some francophone politicians might 
succeed in avoiding even discussion of further reform. They did not completely 
succeed. There has been some “dialogue.” But for the most part francophone 
political leaders continue to resist substantial changes to the status quo. 
The third scenario, further devolution, is the most plausible. The aftermath 
of the 2007 national and the 2009 regional elections, and the perceived risk that 
a prolonged stalemate might jeopardize the future of the Belgian state, might 
someday lead to some sort of Belgian compromise—a compromise in which the 
francophone political elite will eventually, reluctantly accept some additional 
devolution as necessary in order to save the country. The Flemish elite will get 
far less devolution than they desire but will have succeeded in adding to their 
regional power. 
Before the 2007 federal elections, all three mainstream Flemish-language 
parties had indicated they would prefer further devolution of authority to the 
regions, particularly with respect to economic and social-welfare policies. The 
Flemish Socialist party preferred modest changes in the existing federal system 
and strongly advocated regionalizing employment policies. The Flemish 
Christian Democratic Party has suggested it would go much further and would 
prefer a “confederal” state.
143 Such an outcome would require an amended or 
new constitution in which the regions would cede to the national government 
only defined and limited powers, perhaps relating primarily to national defense 
and some aspects of foreign affairs. All of the francophone parties oppose any 
further devolution, and vehemently object to the notions of a confederation or 
Flemish independence. But the political crisis since the 2007 elections has 
forced the Francophones to change their attitude toward any change from a 
firm “No” into a reluctant “Maybe,” at least if the changes are modest. 
 
  142. See  generally Jeroen Maesschalck & Steven Van de Walle, Policy Failure and Corruption in 
Belgium: Is Federalism to Blame?, 29 W. EUR. POL. 999 (2006). 
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A fourth outcome, which still looks very unlikely, would be Flemish 
independence. Presently only the Vlaams Belang and one small conservative 
Flemish party (the N-VA) advocate the creation of an independent Flemish 
state. This might result from either the negotiated dissolution of the Belgian 
state or the successful unilateral secession by Flanders. Assessing the likelihood 
of each possible outcome requires an analysis of a complicated Belgian 
bargaining game. 
Someday the political situation within Belgium might come to resemble a 
game of chicken. In that dangerous game two teenagers drive towards each 
other at high speed down a single lane. The teenager who swerves to avoid a 
crash is the chicken; the teenager who stays in the lane wins the game. If neither 
swerves, they crash and obviously both lose. Each player would like to win; but 
each player would prefer to swerve than to crash. 
In these negotiations the Flemish parties argue for further devolution; the 
francophone parties resist. The Flemish political elite at the national level claim 
that francophone intransigence may risk eventual Flemish secession. Given the 
problem of Brussels and the various legal impediments to secession, the 
francophone parties do not consider the threat of secession credible. Indeed, 
they may believe that in the end the leaders of the mainstream Flemish political 
parties would not support Flemish secession because independence might not 
serve their personal political interests. 
A stalemate might well lead to escalation on the part of the more 
mainstream Flemish parties to put greater pressure on the francophone parties. 
In the face of francophone intransigence, more Flemish politicians may come to 
favor independence, unless there is further devolution. Someday members of 
the Flemish parliament might signal that a majority would support secession if 
the francophone parties remain intransigent. Resolutions might be proposed in 
the Flemish Parliament advocating an advisory referendum to the electorate 
within Flanders on the question of Flemish independence. 
In this bargaining game the Flemish parties are at a real disadvantage. 
Whether a majority in Flanders would come to favor independence, especially 
in light of the problem of Brussels, is hardly clear. More fundamentally, a 
unilateral declaration of independence by the Flemish parliament is of dubious 
legality. These impediments would be substantial, within Belgium, within the 
EU, and for the international community. 
Nothing in the Belgian constitution allows secession. The constitution could 
not be amended to allow it without the support of the francophone parties. If 
the Flemish parliament proposed holding a referendum in Flanders as a prelude 
to a unilateral declaration of independence, those opposed to Flemish 
independence would no doubt bring a lawsuit in the Belgian Constitutional 
Court, which has jurisdiction to resolve all conflicts relating to the allocation of 
authority between the various levels of the federal system. In this court, a 
complainant would likely point to Article 143 § 1 of the Constitution, which 
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communities have an obligation not to endanger the Belgium federal regime.
144 
The suit could challenge the legality of a referendum held in Flanders alone
145 
and claim that whatever its outcome, Flanders could not unilaterally declare its 
independence. It is likely the Belgian court would follow the Canadian ruling in 
the Secession Reference
146 that a referendum in favor of secession in Quebec 
could not establish the basis for unilateral secession; it could do no more than 
create a duty for Quebec and the other Canadian provinces to negotiate in good 
faith.
147 And in good-faith negotiations, there would be no need for the 
francophone parties to agree to Flemish independence. 
External international pressures might also discourage Flemish secession. 
International law strongly discourages unilateral secession because it violates 
state sovereignty, which is at the center of the international system.
148 The issue 
of Flemish secession could be brought before the European Court of Justice,
149 
but here, too, the probability of Flemish success is low. Although those seeking 
Flemish independence would no doubt claim that as a people they have a right 
to self-determination, the international community would probably have little 
sympathy for the claim. Particularly in light of the substantial grant of 
autonomy the Flemish presently have within Belgium, they cannot credibly 
claim they are prevented from participating in the political, economic, and 
 
 144.  ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 414. 
  145.  Even a general national referendum is problematic from a constitutional point of view. Indeed, 
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MCRAE, supra note 5, at 111. 
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  149.  The Final Act of Helsinki lays out an expanded view of self-determination: 
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-
determination, acting at all times in conformity with [governing principles] . . . including those 
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social decisionmaking process of the state. They are not an oppressed minority, 
but a majority who are on average richer than members of the francophone 
community. 
Finally, any attempt at Flemish secession must be examined in the context 
of the European Union. For the EU, the dissolution of Belgium would probably 
be seen as a threatening precedent, given the internal cleavages in other EU 
countries, most notably in Spain, but also in the United Kingdom. Moreover, 
Belgium plays an integral role in the stability of the EU because Brussels is the 
home of many institutions of the European Union. The EU and many member 
states would no doubt apply a great deal of pressure on the parties to negotiate 
a resolution of the conflict short of Flemish independence. 
Notwithstanding all these impediments, a hard-nosed realist would 
recognize that if the Flemish parliament declared independence after a 
referendum in which a substantial majority of the Flemish people voted in favor 
of that outcome, Flanders—like Slovenia—could probably secede and 
ultimately secure international recognition of its independence. There would be 
no civil war, and Flanders would probably become a member of the EU. In fact, 
the very existence of the EU as a supranational structure of twenty-seven 
countries, sharing common values and norms, might, paradoxically, facilitate 
the breakup of a country: because of the EU, a new entity does not have to 
worry about security and economic self-sufficiency, which are often deterrents 
to declaring independence, particularly for small states.
150 
Flemish independence remains unlikely, however, especially given the 
preferences of the mainstream political parties on both sides of the language 
cleavage. With the exception of the Vlaams Belang and the N-VA, all of these 
parties would prefer further devolution to Flemish secession. Unilateral 
secession, therefore, seems highly unlikely unless the francophone parties 
refuse to make any concessions, and a substantial Flemish majority finds the 
stalemate intolerable because the economic burdens of remaining hitched to the 
Walloons outweigh the risks of independence. 
The eventual outcome of the conflict probably will be yet another Belgian 
compromise—a complex and obscure deal that involves some modest degree of 
entitlement reform, and perhaps some further devolution but coupled with 
transitional transfer payments from Flanders to ease the impact in the Walloon 
region and Brussels.
151 
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V 
LESSONS 
The political crisis within Belgium following the June 2007 national elections 
alerted the outside world to the possibility that Belgium might go the way of 
Czechoslovakia and split up. Although the profound social divisions based on 
language and culture had been longstanding, the rest of the world had little idea 
that the internal schism in the heart of Europe was so serious. The good news is 
that the conflict likely will remain nonviolent. The bad news is that national 
reconciliation is unlikely. 
A. Why No Violence? 
The obscurity of this conflict was and is due to the absence of violence and 
bloodshed. Apart from the Belgians’ shared cultural commitment to 
pragmatism and compromise,
152 why might this be so? 
1. Geography 
Most Walloons and Flemish are able to live their day-to-day lives with little 
contact with the “other.” With the exception of Brussels, there is little 
residential integration. Ethnically and linguistically distinct institutions can exist 
without threatening the other ethno-linguistic group. 
2. The Stakes of the Conflict 
Neither the Francophones nor the Flemish see their conflict as existential—
threatening their core identity or their ability to survive as a people. 
Francophone and Dutch-speaking Belgians have both achieved linguistic and 
cultural autonomy, and they control a broad range of governmental policies. 
Moreover, given the existence of the EU, many policies will be set at the 
supranational level regardless of whether Flanders remains a part of Belgium. 
The Flemish Manifesto produced late in 2005 contains mainly pragmatic and 
utilitarian arguments regarding the bureaucratic and economic issues affecting 
the country. No arguments are based on deep issues of corrective justice or 
ethnic supremacy. 
Perhaps more important, no historical memories of mass violence exist 
between the two sides. The Walloons and the Flemish tend to see each other 
not as enemies, who must be demonized, but as peoples with distinctly different 
cultures and incongruent interests. There is no dehumanization, repression, or a 
vicious cycle of revenge such as those remaining predominant factors in other 
ethnic conflicts around the world. Furthermore, the conflict occurs within a 
state that has strong cultural and institutional support for the rule of law and 
the capacity to rebuke, step in, and stop threats of violence. 
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3. Economics 
In spite of the fundamental economic crisis, Belgium remains a rich country, 
and economic disparities between the two peoples are not vast. The average per 
capita income of the Walloons is about three-quarters that of the Flemish.
153 By 
international standards both the Walloons and the Flemish are well off. This is 
in stark contrast to many other ethnic conflicts, in which gross economic 
disparities exacerbate the tensions. For example, the economic disparity of the 
Israelis and the Palestinians is enormous: the average per capita GDP for 
Israelis is about $26,600 while that of Palestinians living in the territories is 
about $1,100.
 154 
4. The Federal System and the Political Elite 
The federal system makes it possible, even easy, for the two groups to “live 
together apart.” The highly inefficient system of government frustrates both the 
Flemish and the Walloons. Yet governance can occur, “not in spite of the 
multiple divisions and the apparent internal difficulties  .  .  . , but because of 
them.”
155 This is what one leading politician has called “the charm of a 
permanent crisis.”
156 The continual threat of dissolution creates the central force 
uniting the two sides, both horizontally (across the regions and language 
communities) and vertically (between a particular region and community and 
the national government). The political elites are bound to each other because 
each knows and fears that not finding a solution is a failure that may ultimately 
diminish his or her own power. Thus, politicians continue to function “within 
the ‘shadow of entropy.’”
157 Inefficiency and frustration, and possibly 
corruption, favoritism, the lack of transparency, and instability, might be the 
price of maintaining a unified Belgium.
158 Although the recent crisis has heavily 
tested the limits of this model, which at moments seemed ready to explode, the 
interim-government solution is yet another proof of the survival talents of 
Belgian politicians. When the heat becomes intolerable, all parties move to cool 
things down. This approach is facilitated by a shared cultural commitment to 
pragmatism and compromise.
159 
B. Why No Reconciliation? 
An interesting question relates to reconciliation. If there is no violence, why 
is there no reconciliation? Why will the characteristics that have led to an 
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absence of violence not allow for a reconciliation in which the Belgian marriage 
is strengthened? 
What could be done to strengthen the glue? To promote reconciliation? To 
strengthen a national Belgian identity?
160 We can imagine a variety of actions 
that might contribute to reconciliation. The media might play a more 
constructive role if it were less parochial.
161 Policies promoting bilingualism 
could stimulate greater social integration over the long run. Electoral reforms 
creating cross-regional electoral districts would encourage the development of 
national political parties.
162 
But, frankly, it is too late. A deep reconciliation is not in the cards. Things 
have gone too far. 
There appears to be little interest in reconciliation or in further integration. 
Today’s debate rests instead on whether Belgium’s two parts should separate 
further. Apart from the monarchy, the institutional mechanisms that might 
stimulate interest in reconciliation are lacking. The most important implication 
of this analysis relates to both the opportunities and limitations of using a 
federal regime to resolve internal conflicts. The good news is that the Belgian 
federal system—though complicated and inefficient—has helped cabin this 
conflict and contribute to the absence of violence. It has allowed those on either 
side of the ethnic and cultural divide to have a greater sense that they can assert 
a substantial degree of autonomy. But the bad news is that the federal system 
has not resolved the conflict, much less led to reconciliation, and may have 
contributed to the amplification of the centrifugal forces that may eventually 
lead to the breakup of the nation. 
One possible explanation is that the interests of the parties have changed. In 
the 1970s, the Flemish wanted greater language and cultural rights and the 
Walloons wanted greater subsidies. Deals could be made in which the Walloons 
accepted federalism and devolution in exchange for money. However, the 
Flemish now have serious concerns about cross-subsidies at present levels. The 
mechanism used in the past, with the Flemish “buying” more autonomy through 
money transfers, no longer seems to be politically feasible. Flanders is also 
worried about its future prosperity and is thus reluctant to continue offering a 
blank check without any terms or conditions of responsibility on the 
beneficiary’s side. This new conflict also suggests a problem with using 
 
  160.  Tom Tyler suggests that it is superordinate identification that is important in shaping people’s 
political attitudes and actions. See Tyler, supra note 133. 
 161.  See  IS  DEMOCRACY  VIABLE  WITHOUT A UNIFIED  PUBLIC  OPINION?  THE  SWISS 
EXPERIENCE AND THE BELGIAN  CASE (Dave Sinardet & Marc Hooghe eds., 2009), available at 
http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-ebooks/ebook-3-democracy-without-unified-public-
opinion; Martin Euwema & Alain Verbeke, Negative and Positive Roles of Media in the Belgian 
Conflict: A Model for De-escalation, 93 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 162.  See K RIS  DESCHOUWER  &  PHILIPPE  VAN  PARIJS, ELECTORAL  ENGINEERING FOR A 
STALLED  FEDERATION:  A  COUNTRY-WIDE  ELECTORAL  DISTRICT FOR BELGIUM’S  FEDERAL 
PARLIAMENT (2009), available at http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-ebooks/ebook-4-
electoral-engineering-stalled-federation. 13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC 9/18/2009  11:05:58 AM 
186 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol.  72:151 
federalism to resolve ethnic conflict, namely, that giving a group some 
autonomy might only increase its desire for more autonomy, thereby destroying 
any hope for full reconciliation. 
C. Living Apart Together 
Returning to the metaphor of the married couple, we think there will be no 
divorce, but there is no real prospect of living together under a strong national 
government. We believe that the goal should be a civilized separation without 
divorce, not the resurrection of an intimate marriage with deep attachments. 
Belgium’s future lies in a model of living apart together—in which the spouses 
can do business with each other, have some shared assets, and treat each other 
with respect. Such a relationship requires the capacity to communicate 
effectively. 
Separating spouses who both want a continuing relationship with the 
children cannot make a “clean break.” They must continue to have some sort of 
relationship with each other, since they remain parents if not partners. In 
Dividing the Child,
 Maccoby and Mnookin identify three common patterns of 
co-parenting relationships after the breakup.
163 The most common is spousal 
disengagement, which essentially involves parallel parenting with little 
communication. A second pattern is conflictual, with parents exhibiting and 
communicating high levels of emotion. The third pattern is cooperative, in 
which high communication leads to low conflict. The impact on the children is 
predictable: in the conflict pattern the children are caught in the middle and are 
adversely affected; in the disengagement pattern, the effects on children are 
intermediate; the cooperative pattern conveys real psychological, social, and 
economic benefits to the children. 
The marriage analogy is suggestive. In considering the organization of 
Belgium’s separation, it would be desirable to move toward a more cooperative 
pattern of communication.
164 Elites on both sides should invest time and energy 
into creating more empathy, respect, and trust between the communities. They 
should underscore the mutual benefits of a more collaborative association.
165 
These actions will require greater tolerance on both sides. But the goal would 
not be to create a stronger national state but instead to enhance the benefits of 
a federal structure that provides substantial autonomy for each community. 
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